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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs Case No. 20080480-SC 
GARETH BOZUNG, 
Defendant / Appellee. 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)(i). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following provisions, relevant to this appeal, are attached at Addendum of the 
Appellant's Brief pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(b)(2): 
UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND. V; UTAH R. CRIM. P. 24. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Where the trial court examined a video taped recording of Defendant's interview with 
police, including the alleged mirandizing, and made findings of fact based on that video, 
did the court erroneously find that the State had failed to show by a preponderance of 
evidence that Defendant had been adequately warned of his Fifth Amendment rights and 
1 
that the State had failed to show by a preponderance of evidence that Defendant had 
knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment rights? 
2. Where trial court suppressed Defendant's statements taken in violation of Miranda, did 
the court commit obvious error and abuse its discretion in applying Rule 24 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure in denied the State's motion for rehearing? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Bozung offers only a brief supplement to the Statement of the Case presented in the 
State's Brief that should follow immediately after the end of the State's summary on page 
11: 
Following the trial court's denial of the State's motion for a rehearing the State filed a 
petition to appeal that was denied by the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 98). The State then 
filed a motion to dismiss noting that the trial court's order suppressing Bozung's 
statements substantially impaired the State's case against him (R. 99). Following the 
order of dismissal the State filed this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Handing the Admonition of Rights form to Bozung and instructing him to initial 
and sign it did not constitute and adequate recitation of Miranda rights in this case. Even 
if Bozung is found to have been adequately warned, the State has not met its heavy 
burden of showing that Bozung waived his Miranda rights. 
The trial courts application of Rule 24 to the State's motion for rehearing did not a 
plain error on the part of the trial court because either the application of the rule was 
9 
appropriate and no error at all, the error was not obvious, or the denial of the motion for 
the reasons discussed by the court were within the court's discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
In its brief the State presented two main arguments. First, that the trial court erred 
in granting Bozung's motion to suppress his interview with the police after his arrest. 
Second, that the trial court erred when it applied the newly discovered evidence standard 
of Rule 24 to the State's motion to reopen the suppression hearing. Bozung responds to 
those arguments in turn. 
I. The trial court acted within its discretion where it found that Bozung was not 
adequately advised of his Miranda rights and rights and never waived his Fifth 
Amendment privileges. 
Examining a violation of Miranda rights is a two-step process. The State has 
correctly noted that "once warnings are given, a defendant may waive his Miranda rights, 
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Appellant's Brief 
at 17 (emphasis added, internal quotations omitted) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 444, 86 S.Ct 1602, 1612, L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). Accordingly this Court must first 
determine whether the warnings were properly given before it can determine whether or 
not waiver was both voluntary and intelligent. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79. Here, 
the trial court correctly found that Bozung did not receive an adequate warning and thus 
any pretext of waiver found in the Admonition of Rights form presented by the State is 
manifestly invalid. 
As Bozung argued at the trial level, State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351 (Ut.App. 1993) 
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stands for three principles, each relevant and highly persuasive in this case: First, all 
persons must be warned by the police of their Miranda rights before interrogation. 
Snyder, 860 P.2d at 355 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471-72). Second, simply asking 
an accused if he understands those rights does not substitute for an adequate recitation of 
those rights. Snyder, 860 P.2d at 358, n. 10. And third, an accused cannot knowingly 
waive Miranda rights unless he has first been adequately advised of those rights by the 
police. (R. 58), Id. These principles must be considered when analyzing this case 
because much of the State's argument is based on a presumption that Miranda was 
properly presented which runs contrary to this Court's decision in Snyder. Bozung 
asserts the trial court correctly suppressed his statements for two interrelated yet distinct 
reasons: One, the trial court found that Bozung was not adequately advised of his 
Miranda rights because he was not sufficiently warned verbally by Detective Moosman 
nor by his own reading of the written Admonition of Rights form (R. 81). Two, the trial 
court found that Bozung did not knowingly waived his Miranda rights upon signing of 
the Admonition of Rights form (R. 81). 
A. Adequate Recitation of Miranda Warnings: 
"The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional 
rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege 
so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was 
aware of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the 
defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior 
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contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact." 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468. See also Snyder, 860 P.2d at 357. Without some valid form of 
recitation a custodial interrogation violates Miranda regardless of an individual's 
personal familiarity with those rights. The State was obligated to show that Bozung was 
properly warned and Bozung agrees with the trial court's finding that a proper recitation 
did not occur (R. 82). 
The video recording of the interrogation clearly supports that finding. From the 
video it is clear that Bozung was in a highly agitated and emotional state at the time he 
was interrogated by Detective Moosman. Bozung was crying, complaining of his 
"broken heart" over his friend's death (R. 126:13:37:01). Moosman then told Bozung 
that he wanted to talk about Josh, and that because Bozung had been arrested Moosman 
needed to go through his rights with him (R. 126:13:37:48, 13:38:02). After stating that 
Bozung had the right to remain silent and saying the he "just need[ed] [Bozung] to initial 
number one" Moosman discontinued the recitation (R. 126:13:38:11). Bozung told 
Moosman "I can just read it, he just read me my rights." (R. 126:13:38:16). Moosman 
said "ok that's fine, if you'll read it, if you understand 'em intitial by 'em." (R. 
126:13:38:16, 83). Bozung then immediately began talking about other things at a time 
when he was supposed to be being warned about his fundamental Fifth Amendment 
privileges (R. 83). Moosman did not return to the subject matter of the rights but just 
directed Bozung to the portions of the form he needed to sign or initial to 'complete' the 
form (R. 83, 82). 
The State contends that since Bozung was experienced with the criminal justice 
system, he volunteered to read his rights himself, completed the form and confirmed that 
he understood, he was adequately warned. Appellant's Brief at 15. However, no amount 
of prior familiarity with ones rights will alleviate the need to be warned prior to 
interrogation. See State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351 (Ut.App. 1993) (citing cases where 
defendants' status as deputy sheriff, police officer, attorney and habitual criminal did not 
alleviate requirement for adequate warning of rights prior to interrogation). See also 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471. "As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that 
anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this warning [the right to consult 
with a lawyer and to have a lawyer present during interrogation] is an absolute 
prerequisite to interrogation. No amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may 
have been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead." Miranda at 471. 
Accordingly the trial court found that the "defendant's attention was very clearly 
divided" and "nothing before me [] persuades me that he paid absolute attention to what 
he was doing... [everything I have persuades me he did not." (R. 121: 23). 
The State cites United States v. Sledge, 546 F.2d 1120, 1122 (4th Cir. 1977) 
proposing that "it is not essential that the warnings required by Miranda... be given in 
oral rather than written form." Appellant's Brief at 16. Bozung does not assert that a 
proper recitation would have required Moosman to recite the Miranda rights orally. 
However, Bozung does allege in this case that the mere existence of the Admonition of 
Rights form is insufficient to establish an adequate recitation of the Miranda warnings. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the video is not clear as to whether Bozung actually read 
the warnings. The trial court's findings that Bozung "did not focus exclusively on the 
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admonitions" and that Bozung "was distracted from the admonitions on the form by the 
matters about which he spoke with Det. Moosman" were supported by the video evidence 
that he was talking constantly to Moosman and frequently looking upon from the form at 
Moosman. Furthermore, Moosman never returned to his attempt to orally recite the 
warnings and allowed Bozung to continue to talk about other subjects as he gave the 
Admonitions form a cursory glance. Therefore, the State did not meet its burden of 
showing that the Miranda rights were properly delivered. 
Bozung was not adequately warned about his Miranda rights. The State's 
argument that he was given the Admonition of Rights form and had the opportunity to 
read it is not sufficient to establish an adequate warning. Because Bozung was not 
warned the State's claims that the trial court incorrectly ruled on the issue of waiver is 
irrelevant. Without a proper warning any alleged waiver is impossible. 
B. Sufficient Waiver of Miranda Rights: 
If this Court concludes that the trial court's finding that the warning was 
inadequate, Bozung maintains that his initials and signature on the Admonitions of Rights 
form did not constitute a valid waiver in this case. If, after the warnings have properly 
been given, "the interrogation continues without a the presence of an attorney and a 
statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the 
defendant knowingly and intentionally waived his privilege against self-incrimination 
and his right to retained or appointed counsel." Miranda at 475 (citing Escobedo v. State 
of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, n. 14, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 1764, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964)). 
Here, after Bozung initialed the Admonition of Rights form Moosman proceeded 
to interview Bozung without an attorney and Bozung's statements constitute the entirety 
of the case against him. At the suppression hearing the State therefore bore the heavy 
burden of proving the validity of the alleged waiver. See State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208, 
1211 (Ut.App. 1987) (the defendant is given the benefit of every reasonable presumption 
against finding a waiver), North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 
1757, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979) ("The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive 
his rights; the prosecution's burden is great..."). 
The State, in its brief, cites State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 898 (Ut.App. 1983) 
noting that this Court "review[s] for clear error the trial court's findings of fact 
underlying the waiver." The clear error standard requires the State to show that the trial 
court's findings of fact are so lacking support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence thus making them clearly erroneous. See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987). Thus, in order to find a valid waiver this Court must be convinced that the 
evidence does not support the trial court's factual findings. This Court must find that the 
trial court's factual findings relative to Bozung's and Moosman's behavior at the 
interrogation are unsupported despite the video evidence that Bozung was distracted, that 
he did not focus on the form while signing it, and that Detective Moosman did not read 
Bozung or ensure that Bozung read his Miranda rights or the waiver. Even if this Court 
would have made different findings were the evidence being reviewed de novo, the clear 
error standard prevents this Court from rejecting the trial court's findings because they 
are not clearly erroneous. 
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After lllis matter came before the trial court for oral argument, and after reviewing 
ll le video of tl ic polic 2 ir itci * no v., t! 1 : tit ial coi irt ei itei 2d its I hidings of fact, conch isions of 
law and order granting Bozung's motion to suppress admissions (R. 85). The trial court 
found that, after discussing the right to remain silent, "Det. Moosman did not advise 
Defer- : :|\ .ncnn\ , :• form and 
place his initials beside certain paragraphs in sequences thai j were J uncertain" (R. 84, 
83). The court further found that Bozung "did not stop talking about [] unrelated issues 
diiring the entire time he looked over the [Admonition 01 knJii>>j u>n*" (K icse 
factual findings, suppoi ted 1:>) ' cleai v ideo evidei ice, led tl le ti ial 
matter of law that Bozung did not knowingly and intentionally waive his Fifth 
Amendment rights (R 81) 
1 1 le State claii 1 is 1 1 ial il tl le totality of the :ii ci 1:1 1 istances demonstrates that a 
defendant had the requisite level of comprehension a court may conclude that the waiver 
was valid. Appellant's Brief at 17 (emphasis added) citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 IJ S. 
412,4. . •* . ;• a . ourt finds knowing 
and intelligent waiver from the totality of the circumstances a trial com t has the 
discretion to find that Miranda rights have been waived. The State then relies on relevant 
ci ii ci il nstai ices, si icl 1 as a defendant's intelligence and education, age and familiarity with 
the criminal justice system, and the proximity of the w aivei to the giving of • I iu c mt la 
warnings, to argue that under the totality of the circumstances Bozung waived his rights 
(R 18). 
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However, when articulating those relevant circumstances in detail the State's brief 
focuses on Bozung's "extensive prior experience with the criminal justice system." (R. 
19). While Bozung agrees that prior experience with the criminal justice system may be 
potentially relevant to a suspect's understanding of the Miranda rights he claims that 
merely asserting that he has experience with the system does not necessarily prove any 
familiarity with Miranda, because, as Officer Moosman admitted, "under most 
circumstances" Miranda rights are not discussed, nor suggest that he understood those 
rights (R. 126:13:38:03). 
Moreover, courts have found that prior arrests and experience with the justice 
system are insufficient to establish that defendants are aware of their Miranda rights. 
United States v. Espinosa-Orlando, 704 F.2d 507, 514 (8th Cir. 1983). The Miranda 
Court went even further when it said that "[n]o amount of circumstantial evidence that 
the person may have been aware of th[ese] right[s] will stand in its stead (referring to an 
explicit recitation)." Miranda at All All. The State's claim that the totality of the 
circumstances analysis should be influenced by Bozung's prior criminal history ignores 
the mandates of Miranda because the rest of the evidence, and the court's factual 
findings, support the conclusion that Bozung did not knowingly waive his rights. 
The State claims that "nothing in the record... supports findings that the 
Defendant was only pretending to read the Form" other than the fact that he was talking 
to Moosman during the time he was supposed to be reading the form. Appellant's Brief at 
21. This assertion ignores not only the burden the State bears in proving waiver but also 
the simple facts demonstrated by the video recording. The State bears the heavy burden 
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to overcome the presumption that Bozung did not waive his rights and the trial court 
recognized this burden In luimnliitin;.' its conclusions in llic negative. The court ruled 
that it "was not persuaded... that the Defendant... was adequately advised11 of his rights 
and that it "was not persuaded... that Defendant knowingly waived his" rights (R. 81) 
As sh< * • "ii'• i .\ Aih' nMHi. led to read the rest of the 
form at 13:38:18. At 13:40:29, two minutes eleven, secoi ids later, Bozi mg reti in is tl le 
form to Moosman. Of that two minutes eleven seconds approximately 86 of those 
seconcf u\: snont talking to Moosman1 many of which Bozung was actually looking up at 
Moosman oi luuumg nis face. 
Citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) the State contends that 
"[a]n express written or oral statement of waiver is usually strong proof of the validity 
ofih.it n .mn Apfu II,nil \ lim/f a( I ' Mo/ung icsponds bv encouraging this Court to 
continue reading where the U.S. Supreme Court noted that an express waiver is i leithei 
"necessary or sufficient to establish waiver... The question is ilot one of form, but rather 
whetl ici tl ic defei idai it ir i fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in 
the Miranda case." Butler, 441 U.S. at 373. Where the < 'miri luis the ahilKv in ,n hulk 
witness the circumstances surrounding the interrogation presumptions of validity based 
on a written waiver are less helpful because the Court may actually witness the recitation 
and the suspect's reaction to il lit llns c;ise the fail Ilium Bo/img iiiiliitlnj ;im.l signed flic 
1
 Approximately 37 seconds between 13:38:21 and 38:58, 5 seconds between 13:39:Q3 
and 39:08, 17 seconds 13:38:13 and 38:30, 7 seconds between 13:39:37 and 39:44. 10 
seconds between 13:39:49 and 39:59, 7 seconds between 13:40:01 and 40:08, and 3 
seconds between 13:40:12 and 40:15. 
11 
Admonition of Rights form should not overshadow the circumstances surrounding the 
alleged waiver that the trial court found unpersuasive.2 As mentioned by the State, a 
waiver is knowing and intelligent if it was "made with a full awareness of both the nature 
of the right[s] being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon [them]." 
Appellant's Brief at 17 (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 
1140(1986)). 
The trial court examined the video and the court took detailed notes relating to the 
conduct both of Moosman and Bozung. The court then made findings of fact based on 
the video. Those findings of fact should be upheld because they are not clearly 
erroneous. The conclusion of law that Bozung did not knowingly and intentionally waive 
his Miranda rights is also not in error and as such should be upheld by this Court. The 
State's claim that the clear weight of the evidence is against the trial court findings is not 
reflected in the evidence. Bozung urges this Court to review the evidence and the trial 
court's findings and conclusions and uphold the trial court's decisions. 
II. The trial court's denial of the State's motion to reopen the suppression hearing 
was not an error because it was either proper, not obviously erroneous or was 
within the court's broad discretion. 
The State appeals the trial court's decision to apply Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, Motion for a New Trial, to the State's motion to reopen the 
suppression hearing. On October 30, 2007 Bozung filed a motion to suppress statements 
"This Court is not persuaded, by a preponderance of evidence, that Defendant 
knowingly waived his right to the presence of an attorney, that he was aware that his 
statements would be used against him in court, or knew that he could stop the 
interrogation at any time." (R. 81). 
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m a d e dur ing a M a y 1, 2 0 0 7 interview with Detective M'oosii lai i (R 39) A,f ter an 
evidenciary hear ing, briefing, a status hear ing and oral a rguments , the trial court entered 
HI iJidi i suppiess ing B o z u n g ' s s ta tement made to Detec t ive M o o s m a n on M a y 1, 2007 
(R. 80). The State then filed a i i lotion I o:i i elieai it ig • ; i i t.i ite si lppression i notion alleging 
that it would like to present evidence of a prior recitation oi Miranda (R. 70). The trial 
court found that the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure do not specifically provide for a 
motio: * • -• is recogni 
Procedure (R. 122:6, 88, 87). Judge Laycock ruled that because there was no rule on 
point the closest rule would be Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 
n n r r s reqiiCMl lm t \w\\ w i nl : «; .- . ; <^irt applied Rule 24 and denied 
the State 's request for a rehearing finding diai tl; * pei'Mmdul < 1ate 
could not have produced the relevant evidence at the original suppression hearing (R. 87, 
86) 
A. The trial court did not commit obvious error in applying Rule 24 
This ruling was not challenged before the trial court and thus, according to the 
State 's bi ief to pi e ^  ' ail or i appeal tl le State must demonstrate that the ;i iai court 
committed plain error on its ruling. Appellant 's Brief at 23, In oi dei for the sn lppi ession 
of evidence to constitute plain error, the State must demonstrate that " (0 a n e r r o r exists; 
0 have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a i € asoi lable Iikjel.il lood of a i it lore fa/v orable ::MI itcon ic • " Sti ih ? v. 
McClellan, 2009 U T 50, f 32 citing State v. Ross, 2007 U T 89, \ 17, 174 i \ 3 d 628. 
i. There was no error 
The State has argued that applying Rule 24 was an error because the rule, by its 
terms, only applies after a final judgment. Appellant's Brief at 24-25. According to the 
State's brief, the trial court committed an error because the State's motion to for 
rehearing was not filed to upset any final judgment of conviction. Id. In his response to 
the State's motion for rehearing Bozung characterized the State's motion as a motion to 
reconsider (R. 73). Because motions for rehearing and motions to reconsider are not 
recognized in the rules of procedure this Court has construed such motions as motions for 
new trial, just as the trial court did. An example is found in State v. Gardner, 23 P.3d 
1043 (Utah 2001), where the defendant, after a motion to suppress statements was denied, 
moved to reconsider his motion to suppress in order to introduce evidence. This Court 
noted that "we construe defendants motion for reconsideration in this case as a motion 
for new trial." Gardner, 23 P.3d at 1045. The trial court, based on precedent from this 
Court, construed the State's motion for rehearing as a motion for new trial and applied 
the "criteria under which a motion for a new trial may be brought" from Rule 24 and 
found the motion lacking. Id. Bozung contends that ruling was not an error. 
An examination of State v. Johnson, 782 P.2d 533 (Ut.App. 1989), provides more 
insight into the court's application of Rule 24 to the State's motion to reopen the 
suppression hearing. In Johnson the Utah Court of Appeals applied Rule 24 to a motion 
by the State to reopen a preliminary hearing. Johnson had been charged with vandalism 
of construction equipment and the trial court ruled that there was not sufficient evidence 
to support vandalism counts so the charges were dismissed. The State then moved to 
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reopen the prelim inn rv h c a n i n ' "adnni l ini* lh.il he II.MI i i i i inicii t ly miscalculated the 
quantum o f ev idence necessary to s h o w probable cause ." State v. Johnson, 782 f} 2d at 
; he State a lso c la imed it "had n e w ev idence inculpating Johnson." Id. 
IV: his case , the appe l l a t e cour t in ,Johnson ruled that a 
motion to reopen a preliminary hearing "serves no ptiipn ,r uthri Ih m In m|msi \\\V tual 
court to reconsider its order of dismissal." fti Johnson the State's failure to produce the 
necessary c\ idnu c in stippmi ,i finding of probable cause resulted in a dismissal. Here, 
the State's failure to produce enough evident, n! Munndii resulted mi ,i disnnsi.il I In. 
fact that the State's failure in Johnson occurred at a preliminary hearing and the State's 
fail occurred at a suppression hearing is of little consequence because the 
evidence supporung pinbable cause in iiin\ i ase uas based cniircly ^MON die statements 
made to Detective Moosman during the May 1, 2009 interrogation (i l) 
When those statements were suppressed there remained no other evidence supporting 
Bozuiiji/s proset niimi A\n\ iihn case was effective < though not technically, dismissed. 
A request to reconsider a final order oi uismi: i 
meets the requirements of a motion under Utah R.Crim.P. 24 for a new trial." Johnson, 
782 I1" "d i\\ S M lio/uug claims that the State's motion for a rehearing on the 
suppression motion following the suppression nf his sfalenients served no piupnse hui tn 
get another "bite of the apple" after failing to produce enough evidence at the hearing (R. 
122: »e court noted the State wanted the court to "give the State a second chance 
on a hearing that w a s set and mi ,no in i i rn i s dial we ie m a d e , and after hearing m y ruling 
and real iz ing the State didn't cover everything the State wants a second » i i i i t ia i n \' (H. 
122: 5). As mentioned above, the State's request for rehearing was a motion to 
reconsider a final order because the suppression effectively ended the case. 
This Court will reverse a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial only if the 
trial court clearly abused its broad discretion. See State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ^  65, 114 
P.3d 551, State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, If 50, 108 P.3d 730, State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220 
(Utah 1985). In this case there was no abuse of discretion because the additional 
evidence the State sought to admit in a new suppression hearing was not newly 
discovered. It could have been produced to the trial court at several points during the 
pendency of Bozung's motion to suppress. The State failed to produce the evidence in 
any timely fashion and the trial court's denial of the motion was within the court's 
discretion. 
ii. Any error was not obvious 
An error is obvious only if "the law governing the error was clear at the time the 
alleged error was made." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^ j 16, 95 P.3d 276 (no obvious error 
because the law at the time the defendant entered his plea was not settled as to the 
requirement that defendant be informed he had the right to "a speedy public trial before 
an impartial jury" as opposed to the right to a "trial by jury"). A trial court's error is not 
obvious when "there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court." State v. Ross, 
951 P.2d 236, 239 (Ut.App. 1997) (cited with approval in State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 
16). The State's claims that the trial court's error in applying Rule 24 to the State's 
motion for rehearing is obvious because Utah case law on the matter is "well-established" 
but upon closer examination. Appellant's Brief at 25. Bozung asserts that the law is far 
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from settled in regards to this issue of what stain l;ird %txiuU applv io a trial court's 
analysis of whether to grant a motion for rehearing of an evidentiary matter. 
he State cites Gardner v. Christensen, 622 P.2d 782, 784 (Utah 
1980). L>ui this case stands io* iiscretio u< ,,\ the request to reopen a 
trial made during the trial. In Gardner the plaintiff, during a una o< 
damages, rested at Uuu A ithout submitting evidence of attorneys' fees. "At the beginning 
of his closing arguinnih pLnn/iffs coun- ' > reopen for the purpose of 
presenting himself as a witness to prove these fees" ;uul tlr rouri denied (In 'MMIIDM 
Gardner, 622 P.2d at 784. This Court ruled that "a motion to reopen to take additional 
e\ iilciuv is ;KUI,'SSI',I In I he soi md discretion of the Court[,]" however, Gardner would 
not serve as establishing a precedent ii •••* .i -. because it dealt 
with a motion to reopen a trial made during closing arguments of the trial. 
1 his case moved to rehear after a motion u- suppress was filed (R. 39, 
October 30, 2007), after an evident mrv Iieai ing was held I h\ I v3 h alter further briefing 
by the parties (R. 54, 65), after a status hearing (R. 120), and <iltei oi.il .irjuiin^nis wcte 
made (k u I ;l) J! 1) Not until after all this evidence and argument was presented and the 
court ruled did the state (hen inpu^i n . ail lliis other evidence (P nn*) Tn this 
situation it is unlikely that Gardner would have served as ob\ IOUS oi semen piei edenl 
upon the trial court. See also Ross v. Leftwich, 14 Utah 2d 71, 377 P.2d 495, 497 (1963) 
(case diMiiiNsed «ii imal Un l<n k of evidence, the trial court's denial of amotion to reopen 
at trial was ruled an abuse of discretion), Shite r, Sir/, 8? / 1* 2d M"v4, (><>J {I H.Ap 
(upheld the trial court's granting of the State's motion to reopen trial after judge 
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dismissed a charge following the presentation of the State's evidence). Although these 
cases represent a trial court's discretion to reopen trials to present new evidence before 
the trial was over they are not well-settled on the issue the trial court in this case was 
presented and thus would not serve as settled law on the matter before Judge Laycock so 
as to make her application of Rule 24 an obvious error. 
The State also cites State v. Duncan, 102 Utah 449, 132 P.2d 121, 125 (1942) on 
this same proposition but the facts seem to suggest that the principles of Rule 24 suit it 
better than the discretion standard the State is suggesting. In Duncan the jury had retired 
to deliberate in a hit and run charge when a witness who had been subpoenaed by the 
prosecution, but who was not called to testify, approached defense counsel with 
exculpatory evidence. Duncan, 132 P.2d at 123. The defendant then moved to recall the 
jury and reopen the case and the court denied the motion. Id. This Court reversed based 
on the newly discovered evidence standard, much like the standard applied by Judge 
Laycock (R. 87). The witness's evidence could not "have been discovered by defendant 
and introduced at the trial unless the court had permitted defendant to reopen the case" 
and "[i]t was not discovered until after the jury retired to commence deliberations." Id. at 
124. Again this case fails to set precedent for the trial court in this case and fails to show 
obvious error. If anything, it supports the trial court's application of Rule 24 in this 
matter. 
Without addressing the State's other cited case, the rest of which are more than 60 
years old and as removed in applicability as Gardner, Ross, Seel and Duncan, Bozung 
simply asserts that, contrary to the State's claim, the trial court did not ignore well-
1Q 
established case law when it applied Rule 24 to the State's motion for rehearing. At very 
least the law was not clear as to what standard applied to a motion for reopening a 
Su • < - • • n g . 
Even if, as the State suggests, "a majority of jurisdictions considering the issue 
have rejected the" newly discovered evidence standard Utah case law is unsettled and the 
ti I a. 1 coi Jit's review oft! ic i i lajority position would not have required it to use the 
discretion standard under Ross. Appellant's Brief a I M> I In- in.il i null * .ipplu ,ilnm n.f 
Rule 24 was supported by case law (State v. Gardner, 23 P.3d 1043 (Utah 2001) and 
Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991)) and was not contrary to 
any settled Utah .ijipclL-ilc l;t>i un ihr www Vvnnlnii'h in nilnn' n.n an cum iln iii'or 
was not obvious, and thus the State cannot establish plain error. 
iii if the trial court plainly erred the appropriate remedy is remand 
If 1:1 me ti 1 a.I coi n 1: plaii il) ei i eel 1:1 ICI I tl lis Coi n t's i ei i leciy shot ild be to remand the 
matter for reconsideration by the trial court using the correct s tandam. i ne State 
requested this Court to remand "this matter to the trial court with an order to reopen the 
suppressioi 11 leai it ig" based oi I tl le allegation that the trial court applied the wrcrr, 
standard. Appellant 's Brief at 33 . However, because the State 's n 1 ' ^ ' : * ^ ^ i 
court applied the wrong standard to the State 's motion to reconsider, the remedy should 
lie a niiiaiid w illi instn ictions to review the State 's motion for rehearing under the proper 
standard and not a ruling on (lit" tnulimi ilsell", Scr Molcr v < If htana^cmmi ( W'/1,, 
2008 U T 46, 190 P.3d 1250 ("Because the district court applied the wrong standard, it did 
not make the necessary findings for us to conduct a review using the correct standar 
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therefore we remand for the district court to make factual determinations and apply the 
correct standard"). See also Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, 200 P.3d 662 
("Ordinarily, when the district court applies the wrong legal standard the matter is 
reversed and remanded so that the district court may consider the evidence under the 
proper standard"). 
B. In any event the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the State's 
Motion for Rehearing 
The State has acknowledged the trial court has broad discretion in deciding 
whether to reopen evidentiary matters. Appellant's Brief at 27. A trial court's discretion 
extends to considerations of preparedness. Even before the suppression hearing the State 
was on notice of the potential Miranda evidence because of the statements made by 
Bozung on the tape (R. 126:13:38:15, "He just read me my rights"). The State was on 
notice that the evidence of the alleged prior mirandizing would be relevant at the hearing 
by Bozung's motion to suppress. The State was on notice at the hearing on November 
21, 2007 that the alleged mirandizing was at issue when Moosman testified that he had no 
personal knowledge of it (R. 113:15). At that time the trial court asked the parties if there 
were any other witnesses or evidence and the State failed to offer it (R. 113:16). After 
the hearing was completed and the briefs were submitted the State was on notice that 
Bozung was challenging the adequacy of Moosman's warning. Finally, the State could 
have requested to offer the evidence at the December 12, 2007 status hearing (R. 120) or 
before the trail court made its ruling on January23, 2008 (R. 121:10). It is especially 
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telling that when the court asked the parties for arguments on the motion to suppress the 
State responded that the video was the best evidence At any point prior to the trial courts 
ruling the State could have attempted to present this evidence. It is within the trial 
court's discretion to consider these delays and deny the State's request. Even if the trial 
court applied the wrong standard, it is clear from the record that the court was prone to 
deny the State's request based on their failure to present the evidence that they had clear 
notice would be relevant at the suppression hearing and throughout the suppression 
process. 
The State argues that a "broad spectrum of factors that should inform a trial 
court's discretion when ruling on a motion to reopen a suppression hearing" and then 
discusses why these factors should have weighed in favor of reopening the hearing. 
Appellant's Brief at 305 31. 
Bozung contends that the factors just as readily weigh in favor of denying the 
motion for rehearing: 
One, the State claims that the nature of the case being a first degree felony and the 
fact that suppression affected the State's ability to pursue those charges. Appellant's 
Brief at 31. This factor could just as easily persuaded that trial court to wonder why the 
State had been so unprepared for the suppression hearings when it had more than 
adequate notice that Miranda was a seriously contested issue and from the very 
beginning knew that Bozung could well have been given his rights by other Lehi police 
officers. 
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Two, the timeliness of the motion and that reason for not presenting the evidence 
at the first issue. The State claims that because the alleged Miranda warning was not at 
issue in the original motion it cannot be blamed for failing to seek to provide additional 
evidence at any time before the court ruled. However, the State had been put on notice 
from the first filing of the motion to suppress that Bozung was challenging the efficacy 
and adequacy of Moosman's recitation of the Miranda warnings along with the waiver of 
those rights. The State also was aware from the initial receipt of an audiotape of 
Moosman's interview with Bozung, prior to the filing of the motion to suppress, that 
Bozung mentioned to Moosman that another officer had read him the rights (R. 113: 8). 
Furthermore, at the suppression hearing Bozung questioned Moosman heavily on this 
very point (R. 113: 15). Despite all of that, the State did not make any effort to put on 
additional evidence on this issue while the motion to suppress was pending. Cf. State v. 
James, 635 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Wash. App. 1981) (At suppression hearing the trial court 
raised a new issue. The State asked for a continuance and the trial court's refusal was 
deemed an abuse of discretion). 
Three, whether the evidence would have impacted the trial court's decision. The 
State asserts that "in light of the trial court's ruling evidence concerning Defendant's first 
Miranda warnings became crucial to the prosecutor's argument." Appellant's Brief at 
32. Bozung concedes that the evidence may have impacted the trial court's decision. 
However, the State was given ample opportunities to put into evidence the information it 
now seeks. Almost immediately after Moosman was questioned by Bozung about this 
other reading of Miranda rights, the trial court asked the parties, "Any other witnesses or 
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evidence we need to put on?" (R. 113: 16). The State was silent and made no attempt to 
request time or opportunity to present the evidence they now claim is so important. 
Additionally, they had other opportunities prior to the trial court's ruling on the motion to 
suppress in which to seek admission of this testimony. However, they failed to do so. 
The final factor mentioned is the impact of reopening on a trial court's resources 
or docket. The State claims that there is no evidence in the record suggesting undue 
interference with the trial court's resources or docket. Bozung asserts that the record 
itself, and the fact that there were multiple hearings and conferences on the matter should 
weigh at least as heavily toward denial as granting. 
The State defends the prosecutors timing by mentioning that he moved to reopen 
the suppression hearing within two days of the court's noting that the evidence was 
relevant as if the prosecutor would have any question while a motion to suppress for a 
failure to give Miranda warnings that evidence of an alleged mirandizing would be 
relevant. The State's reluctance to produce such evidence, if it existed, as soon as the 
motion to suppress was filed is inexcusable. 
In State v. James, 635 P.2d 1102, 1103 (Wash App. 1981)—a case cited to by the 
State—the Washington court stated, "Discretion is abused only where no reasonable man 
would take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable men could differ as to the 
propriety of the action taken by the trial court, it cannot be said the trial court abused its 
discretion." Here, Bozung asserts that the trial court's decision not to allow the State to 
reopen the suppression hearing in this case was not unreasonable nor an abuse of 
discretion. The State had nearly three months and three hearings where it could have 
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provided the trial court with the information it now claims is so critical. Instead, they 
waited until after the trial court had ruled to raise the issue of this evidence they had 
known about from the beginning. The trial court has been given broad discretion to make 
such a ruling, and she thoughtfully made it. Bozung accordingly asks that this Court 
affirm the ruling of the trial court denying the State's motion for reconsideration of the 
suppression issue. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Because the State has not shown that Bozung received an adequate recitation of 
the Miranda rights the State's claim that he waived those rights is irrelevant. 
Additionally, even if the trial court's factual findings are found to be clearly erroneous 
and the alleged reading of the Admonition of Rights form served as an adequate warning, 
the State has not overcome its heavy burden to proving that Bozung knowingly and 
intentionally waived his Fifth Amendment rights. For these reasons Bozung requests the 
Court to uphold the trial court's suppression of the evidence. 
Because the State has failed to show that the trial court's application of Rule 24 to 
the State's motion for rehearing was an obvious error, or was an abuse of discretion, this 
Court should affirm. If the Court finds an obvious harmful error, this Court should 
remand with instructions to the district court to apply the proper standard. 
24 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of September, 2009. 
Margaret P.Xindsay 
Thomas H. Means 
Counsel for Appellee 
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DISTRICT No. 071402713 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW, and ORDER SUPPRESSING 
DEFENDANT'S ADMISSIONS 
Hon. Claudia Laycock 
This matter came on for oral argument on Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Statement on the 23rd day of January, 2008. This Court, having reviewed the parties' 
written memoranda and the CD recording of the subject interview and having given due 
consideration to the arguments of the parties, now enters these: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On 1 May, 2007 Defendant was arrested and retained in custody by Lehi City 
Police officers on charges unrelated to this case. 
2. Detective Moosman of the Highland-Alpine Police Department interviewed 
Defendant at the Lehi City Police Department while Defendant remained in custody. 
3. The entire interview was visually and audibly recorded. A CD disk recording of 
the interview has been admitted into evidence. From such recording the following 
sequence of events is apparent to this Court. 
4. When Defendant entered the interview room he appeared distraught and 
concerned about unrelated personal family matters. 
5. Det. Moosman engaged Defendant briefly about such family matters; another 
officer brought Defendant a Mountain Dew to drink; Defendant was not handcuffed or 
otherwise physically restrained; Defendant and Det. Moosman sat across from each 
other at a table. 
6. Before beginning the interrogation, Det. Moosman told Defendant that it was 
necessary to go through his rights with him and explained "right here you do have the 
right to remain silent, do you understand?" 
7. Defendant responded "yea" 
8. Det. Moosman passed Defendant a document and asked Defendant to initial 
"number 1 saying you under stand that." The document that Det. Moosman was 
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referring to was the waiver of rights form that has been made an exhibit in the file of this 
matter; the form does include written admonitions of all the rights that are required by 
Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
9. Defendant accepted the form and said "I can just read it, he just read me my 
rights." 
10. Det. Moosman responded, "ok, that's fine, if you'll just read 'em and if you 
understand 'em if youll initial 'em." 
11. From this point forward Det. Moosman did not advise Defendant of his 
further rights but allowed Defendant to apparently read the form and place his initials 
beside certain paragraphs in sequences that are uncertain to this Court. 
12. Simultaneous with Defendant's handling the form, he and Det. Moosman 
continued to discuss matters unrelated to Defendant's constitutional rights including, 
the sale of Defendant's family home, the soaring price of homes, a family dispute 
concerning Defendant's use of his mother's prescription drugs, the fact that his father 
feels he is selfish, that he has been kicked out of his house for his language, that he 
hadn't use, (drugs) that day, and that a "kid" he met last night told him he doesn't use, 
he only smokes weed and drinks beer. Defendant did not stop talking about these 
unrelated issues during the entire time he looked over the form. 
13. While Defendant handled the form and simultaneously talked about the 
subjects noted above, Det. Moosman interjected, "sign right here", "now do you under 
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stand all this stuff?", "and if you understand and agree with it, sign there ... and I'll sign 
as a witness". 
14. This Court is unable to determine from the written form, the CD recording, or 
the testimony elicited at the preliminary examination in what sequence Defendant 
initialed the various places where his initials appear on the form, or whether Defendant 
actually read the various admonitions on the form, much less whether Defendant 
comprehended any of the admonitions. 
15. It is clear to this Court that Defendant did not focus exclusively on the 
admonitions written on the form. 
16. It is clear to this Court that Defendant was distracted from the admonitions 
on the form by the matters about which he spoke with Det. Moosman. 
17. It appears to this Court that Defendant signed the form voluntarily. 
18. This Court is unable to determine from the evidence that //Defendant was in 
fact previously advised of his Miranda rights, who so advised him, whether such 
admonitions were adequately recited to Defendant, whether Defendant understood 
each of such rights, or whether Defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived each of 
such rights. 
Upon the foregoing, this Court now enters these : 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. By a preponderance of evidence, this Court concludes that Det. Moosman did 
not read from the form to Defendant or otherwise verbally advise Defendant that 
anything Defendant said would be used against him in court, that Defendant had a right 
to have an attorney present during questioning, or that questioning would cease if 
Defendant asked it to cease or asked for an attorney. 
2. This Court is not persuaded, by a preponderance of evidence, that Defendant, 
by his own reading of the written waiver of rights form, was adequately advised that 
anything he said would be used against him in court, that he had a right to have an 
attorney present during questioning, or that questioning would cease if he asked it to 
cease or asked for an attorney. 
3. This Court is not persuaded, by a preponderance of evidence, that prior to the 
interview by Det. Moosman, Defendant was previously adequately advised of his 
Miranda rights by other police officers, that Defendant understood each of such rights, 
or that Defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived each of such rights. 
4. This Court is not persuaded, by a preponderance of evidence, that Defendant 
knowingly waived his right to the presence of an attorney, that he was aware that his 
statements would be use against him in court, or knew that he could stop the 
interrogation at any time. 
Upon the foregoing, this Court now enters this: 
5 
ORDER 
It is hereby ordered that all of Defendant's statement made to Alpine-Highland 
Det. Moosman on or about 1 May, 2007 at the Lehi City Police Department be and 
hereby is suppressed and shall not be admitted as evidence at the trial of this matter. 
Dated this day of \<)oW^U^\ ^ . 2008. 
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MOTION FOR REHEARING ON 
SUPPRESSION MOTION 
Case No. 071402713 
Judge Claudia Laycock 
Comes now the State, by and through counsel, Craig Johnson, and respectfully requests that 
the Court allow a rehearing regarding the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, which was granted on 
January 23,2008. The State would like to present evidence from the Lehi police officers who read 
the Defendant his Miranda rights in another case before Detective Moosman attempted to Mirandize 
the Defendant in this matter, both of which occurred at the Lehi Police Department minutes apart 
on May 1,2007. This evidence is vital to giving the Court the full picture of what the Defendant was 
referring to when he stated he had already been read his rights after Detective Moosman read him 
his right to remain silent. Based on this additional testimony, the State would argue that the totality 
of the circumstances demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant made a 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his constitutionally-guaranteed Miranda rights. 
SIGNED this L I day of Pgy^ , 2008. 
Deputy/Jtah County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR REHEARING 
ON SUPPRESSION MOTION was sent via inter-office mail, to the following: 
Tom Means 
Utah County Public Defender's Office 
50 South University Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84606 
^ffittj t£$d\ ftuQj^ 
2 
FFP i9;uutrNA 
STATS OF UTAH UTA?! COlWTV 
Thomas H. Means (2222) 
Utah County Public Defender Association 
Attorney for Defendant _.. . , , , - _ „ . . -
Historic Utah County Courthouse "~"' "'*"'" ""'""" 
51 South University Avenue , / „ t\1 - l O U M 
Provo, Utah, 84601 / O M v / 
(801)852-1070 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 










DISTRICT No. 071402713 
ORDER IN RE: 
STATE'S MOTION 
FOR REHEARING 
Hon. Claudia Laycock 
This matter came on before this Court on the 6th day of February, 2007, for 
argument on the State's Motion for Rehearing of the Order Suppressing Defendant's 
Admissions. The State was represented by Craig Johnson, Deputy Utah County 
Attorney. Defendant appeared personally and was represented by his attorney of 
record, Thomas H. Means. Having duly considered the parties' written and oral 
arguments, this Court now enters the following findings: 




2. A Motion to Reconsider is not specifically provided for in the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Neither are such motions recognized in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure1 (Watkiss & Campbell v Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah, 1991)), 
however they have been reviewed as if brought under some other proper rule and 
simply mistitled. / d , at 1064-65. 
3. The most closely appropriate rule of criminal procedure that would govern the 
State's Motion for Rehearing on Suppression Motion would be Rule 24, Motion for New 
Trial. 
4. The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the standard to be used when a 
party seeks to introduce additional evidence in support of a motion for new trial. Such 
evidence "must be such as could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered 
and produced at the trial[.]" State v James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah, 1991). 
5. This Court determines, by a preponderance of evidence, that the State was 
aware of the possible existence of witnesses who could have provided evidence relative 
to Defendant having been advised of his Miranda rights prior to being interviewed by 
Detective Moosman. 
xSee Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 81(e) making the civil rules of procedure 
applicable in criminal cases "where there is no other applicable statute or rule ...." 
2 
* tjb - *! 
6. This Court is not persuaded, by a preponderance of evidence, that the State 
could not have produced, with reasonable diligence, such witnesses or other evidence 
relative to the issue at this Court's original hearing on 23 January, 2008. 
Dated this 
Upon the foregoing, this Court denies the State's Motion for Rehearing. 
-
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